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Title: Event and subject: how does appearance appear?

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Abstract: In Heidegger's phenomenology, an *event* concerns the ontology of experience. The event is not merely an occurrence in my world, but the point from which my world is constituted. The event does not relate to any ontic reality, but the coming about of reality, the presence and "presencing" of Being itself. One problem arising here is that this cannot be described in experiential terms: the event is appearance which itself does not appear. To be able to describe the experience of the ontological coming about of reality, I propose considering the idea of the event as presenting me with an *involuntary aspect* of my experience. While the appearance of things is grasped by me as a subject, consciously experiencing them and being able to reflect on them, at the same time the appearing of that appearance confronts me with the fact of having experiences, reformulating the event in subjective terms.

Keywords: Heidegger; event; phenomenology; transcendental constitution; subjectivity

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Event and subject: how does appearance appear?

Daniel Neumann¹

Abstract

In Heidegger's phenomenology, an *event* concerns the ontology of experience. The event is not merely an occurrence in my world, but the point from which my world is constituted. The event does not relate to any ontic reality, but the coming about of reality, the presence and "presencing" of Being itself. One problem arising here is that this cannot be described in experiential terms: the event is appearance which itself does not appear. To be able to describe the experience of the ontological coming about of reality, I propose considering the idea of the event as presenting me with an *involuntary aspect* of my experience. While the appearance of things is grasped by me as a subject, consciously experiencing them and being able to reflect on them, at the same time the appearing of that appearance confronts me with the fact of having experiences, reformulating the event in subjective terms.

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In working out his notion of the event, Heidegger left behind the existentialism of *Being and Time*, moving from the question of how Being appears to *Dasein* to how Being occurs (*weset*) as *event*.² This could be described as turning away from phenomenology to ontology.³ The event turns the existential being-in-the-world of *Dasein* into a constant presencing and withdrawal of Being – which still requires someone to whom (and for whom) the event happens.⁴ Thus, the world as "experienced event" is in a constant flux, but not because this flux is based on an existential temporalization, but because *the event itself opens space and makes time pass*.⁵ It is as if the Heideggerian notion of the event relocates the transcendental conditions of experience.

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² The term "Being", writ large, indicates not merely the nominalization of the verb "being", but the problem of what it means that things come to be. "Being as event" hints at the idea that something never merely *is*, but that Being is a constant process, or event, whose ontology Heidegger's later work sets out to explore.

³ Cf. Miguel de Beistegui, *Truth and Genesis* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 109ff.

⁴ In his "Contributions", Heidegger deems those who will be able to experience and thereby shelter the event as "the ones to come", cf. Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, trans. Parvis Emad, Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1999), 277ff. The futurity implied here creates a sense of mystery which I will try to dispel in the following by focusing on the event as constitutive of present, subjective experience.

⁵ In a similar vein one could say: "The event does not take place like an ordinary event in the objective world (that is within an already established order), but rather occurs such that it changes the very setting within which entities appear and ordinary events occur." Markus Gabriel, *Transcendental Ontology. Essays in German Idealism* (London: Continuum, 2011), 77.

⁶ Roughly ten years after its appearance, Heidegger reflects on his own line of thought in "Being and Time" as

rience of Kant (and Neo-Kantian phenomenology), as well as the temporality developed in *Being and Time*, to an outside.⁶ Instead of being the subject's own modalities of experience or the ecstatic transcendence of present, past and future, the conditions of experience are now encountered as an external happening and the subject is constituted by the event.⁷

The appearance of Being as and through beings can be phenomenologically addressed as the being-in-the-world of *Dasein*. By contrast, grasping the appearance or emergence of Being in the event, as it is developed by Heidegger in his *Contributions to Philosophy* and related writings, is decidedly more difficult. To understand how the event of Being appears, i.e. *becomes visible or experienceable*, my approach in this article will be to inquire how it can be experienced *subjectively*. Notwithstanding Heidegger's skepticism towards the philosophical subject as an early modern invention,⁸ I will discuss how the ontological rupture of the event can be conceived as a subjective experience.⁹ In other words, rather than tying Heidegger's later writings back to his philosophy of existence and to *Dasein*, I want to think about how

to align his notion of the event with a transcendental constitution of subjectivity. This will allow me to address a central problem of Heidegger's event, namely *its tautological character*.

Heidegger himself alluded to this tautological character of the event as the "originary meaning" of phenomenology, for phenomenology is not so much a method as a way leading to what is at first inapparent, i.e. the coming into presence as such."¹⁰ Accordingly, the idea of the event simply makes explicit what is happening all along, the groundless and ceaseless coming into presence of the world as we experience it. Because of its "inconspicuous" character, this has been dubbed "phenomenology of the inapparent", which is not concerned with "the appearance *but the appearing of the appearance*, an appearing that therefore does not appear"¹¹. Thus, while the event could be considered nonexistent insofar as there is no tangible effect brought about by it, it is what makes everything (including myself) appear in the first place. On the one hand, the event is inapparent, changing nothing about *what* we experience. On the other hand, the event is a disruption of experience because it is what

serving as a first step away from a thinking of representation, which has yet to be grounded in an ontological setting (*Da-Sein*), instead of an existential one (*Dasein*), cf. Heidegger, *Contributions*, 219f. The fact that in the later writings, Being does not unfold phenomenologically as it did in "Being and Time" makes the question of who experiences the event of Being all the more difficult.

⁷ While there is an eminent sense of the event being historical in that it determines the basic structure of the ontology of an epoch, such that Being is understood as, for instance, *physis*, creation, or representation, my focus here will be on how the event as such happens. In other words, my concern is not with the event as bringing about a *specific* understanding of being, but of being in a more general sense, of the event simply bringing about "presence".

⁸ A comprehensive treatment of subjectivity as a modern phenomenon, in which the world is transformed into a representation, thereby blocking the way to consider truth as anything but certainty can be found in "The Age of the World Picture", cf. Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture", in: *Off the Beaten Track*, trans. Julian Yong, Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 66ff.

⁹ Here, my minimal definition of a philosophical subject means simply that experience is constituted by *a priori* conditions and that the subject can reflect on the contents of experience and on itself, having experiences. This leaves open whether these conditions have a merely justifying (*quid iuris*) or generative (*quid facti*) role.

¹⁰ Quoted in Françoise Dastur, "Time, Event and Presence in the Late Heidegger," *Continental Philosophy Review* 47 (2014): 420.

¹¹ François Raffoul, "Phenomenology of the Inapparent," in: *Unconsciousness Between Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis*, ed. Dorothée Legrand, Dylan Trigg (Dordrecht: Springer, 2017), 116.

¹² This simple notion of bringing experience about would not be easy to frame in Heideggerian terms, as there are several steps involved in even intimating, let alone experiencing the event, such as an initial attunement

brings experience about.¹²

From a subjective perspective, one may then ask: can we think the event other than as a coming about of Being itself, or does this phenomenological approach restrict us to the tautology of the appearing of appearance? A purely ontological sense of the event would beg the question of what is actually experienced. What am I conscious of when experiencing the presencing of Being itself? Granted that I am always necessarily exposed to Being in its ontic sense, to things, persons or my own thoughts, even the most disruptive event has to be *of* something, other than Being itself coming about. In other words, even if the event concerns just the ontological dimension of experience, resulting in the “phenomenology of the inapparent”, the invisibility of the event still has to be gleaned from ontic things, otherwise the idea of a tautology would not make sense.¹³ But how could the event be such a basic, disruptive force to my experience and yet change nothing about it whatsoever? How can the phenomenology of the event be not just about the presencing of Being, but also about the coming to presence of a certain Being, or beings?¹⁴

In the following, I will argue for a non-coincidence of experience with itself, as opening up a possibility to reflect on the coming about of experience. The idea I will take up in

this article is that this non-coincidence is akin to Heidegger’s notion of the event as opening a time-space (*Zeit-Raum*) from which time and space originate, making appearance possible.¹⁵ But instead of formulating this in such ontological terms, a description which may quickly take a turn towards the mystical and ineffable, I want to remain in the realm of subjective experience where every appearing ultimately has to be accounted for by the one to whom it appears. After having established the idea of a non-coincidence of experience with itself, I will then set out to frame this as a subjective version of the event, using two Heideggerian notions as pointers: the event as auto-differentiation, and the event as a dynamic of presencing and withdrawal.

In trying to align the event with subjectivity, I want to suggest that the event basically presents me with *an involuntary aspect* of my experience. While the appearance of things is grasped by me as a subject, consciously experiencing them and being able to reflect on them, at the same time the appearing of that appearance confronts me *with the fact of having experiences*. The event “ties me to my experiencing”, showcasing how, in experiencing, I am active and passive at the same time. While I am receptive to having experiences and to freely considering them, on a more basic level, receptivity does not put me in a position where

necessary to make the leap into the “other beginning”, where an originary relation to Being can be grounded as Da-Sein, cf. Heidegger, *Contributions*, 125ff. This article can be considered as an attempt to think the emergence of the event without these “preparations”.

¹³ In the “Contributions”, Heidegger is adamant about leaving the ontological difference between Being and beings behind, as it presents a barrier to the question of the emergence of Being as event, cf. Heidegger, *Contributions*, 176f. Equally, by framing the event in terms of subjectivity, the ontological difference is displaced.

¹⁴ A somewhat similar problem is raised by Daniela Vallega-Neu, who, in thinking along the lines of an embodiment of the experience of the event, speaks of the co-originary occurrence of being and beings, such that “we would have to say that every moment is characterized and determined *as well* by beings”. Daniela Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger’s Poietic Writings. From ‘Contributions to Philosophy’ to ‘The Event’* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018), 58.

¹⁵ Cf. Martin Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper Torchbooks), 13.

¹⁶ This approach then also differs from Heidegger’s late notion of a releasement towards things (*Gelassenheit zu den Dingen*), as the paradigmatic activity related to the event here is not dwelling, but experiencing, cf. Martin Heidegger, *Discourse on Thinking*, trans. John M. Anderson, E. Hans Freund (New York et.al.: Harper Torch Books, 1966), 55f

I “possess” the contents of my experience, but where I experience them necessarily.¹⁶

This presumes that a transcendental constitution of subjectivity does not equal a *souverain position* over the experience this constitution affords. To conceive experience as originating from a set of subjective conditions does not put me in a position where I master and measure the world because it has now become “my” representation, as Heidegger’s critical understanding of subjectivity would have it.¹⁷ One could equally claim that I am *subject to* my experience, that I am not the one putting it in front of me, as *Vorstellung* and that the happening, or event, of experience does not in itself already determine any division between subject and object. For this reason, a reflection on experience as *evental* or *ereignishaft*, can become a moment of *thaumazein*, a wonder about the fact that there is experience at all, rather than nothing.

This is exactly the kind of wonder that a phenomenology of the inapparent is unable to address. Here, the fact that appearance itself does not appear also means that we cannot observe ourselves experiencing the event coming about. It remains invisibly linked to the appearance of beings, an appearance which cannot be addressed as dependent on our receptivity. As a result, the appearing itself is, or remains, inapparent. By contrast, to construe the event as subjective experience entails the idea that the appearing of appearance can itself become apparent and in some sense conceivable. Of course, as subjects, we cannot see the contents of our experience “emerge in front of us” in some magical fashion. But we can question the

self-evidence with which appearance appears to us based on a transcendental constitution. The appearing of appearance can be observed as experience senselessly coming about, provided we are receptive to it. While the Heideggerian notion of the event is concerned foremost with the ontological coming about of Being itself, relegating the ontic beings to subjectivity, by focusing on the receptivity to the event, we can subjectively reflect on the coming about of Being *as* and *in* experience.

With regards to Heidegger, an objection against this suggestion would be that Being, insofar as it is somehow compatible with subjectivity, becomes historical and contingent. In other words, by squaring the coming about of Being and the coming about of experience, one risks making Being dependent on subjective experience, thereby undoing Heidegger’s work of trying to lead us out of the limitations of subjectivity. Being, in Heidegger’s philosophy, is what is driving the history of hermeneutics, of every attempt to understand what it means that things *are*.¹⁸ This also means that Being itself, in its ceaseless coming, remains beyond the reach of any attempt to define it once and for all.¹⁹ If we were to subjectively experience its coming, then we would make it contingent on our transcendental constitution, which, as a philosophical idea, is itself contingent, antedated by the question of what Being *is*.

As a response, I have no way to dispel this objection. Indeed, I would embrace it insofar as it hints at a dependency of Heidegger’s own philosophy of the event on subjectivity. Yet I disagree with it insofar as it seems to me that Being, subjectively understood, could

¹⁷ For instance, Descartes’ ontology of the world as *res extensa* already passes over the world as phenomenon, i.e. as what shows itself from itself, thereby enclosing the world within subjective representation and barring access to any question of Being as such, cf. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 88.

¹⁸ Cf. Mark A. Wrathall, *Heidegger and Unconcealment. Truth, Language and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 184f.

¹⁹ At least, the history of Being from out of the event would have to be very different from the history of metaphysics and the interpretation of Being as various forms of beings, cf. Heidegger, *Contributions*, 304.

still be thought of as motivating the history of hermeneutics. This would not present us with a mystical or otherworldly force beyond the reach of mundane understanding. Instead, it would be open to be reflected on subjectively. It would be a much more exoteric idea of the coming about of Being, compared to the prophetic and Nietzschean vision Heidegger paints in his *Contributions to Philosophy*, where the secret of the event, as the unconcealed concealment of Being, will only be known by a futural elite.²⁰

Another objection to this subjective account is that it effaces the disruptive character of the event. When the recognition of the event depends on our own receptivity and upon its reflection, is not an event in any traditional sense excluded by this? Would this not mean that we have to determine what an event is for it to “happen”? One way to counter this would be to speak, with Claude Romano, of a necessary delay of the meaning of an event, which is unfolded only *a posteriori*. In other words, I can only speak of events as what will have been. The requirement that the event is disruptive and immediate *is relative to our comprehension of it*. It takes time to grasp an accident that is suddenly happening and has happened, or continues to happen as trauma, as a disablement etc.²¹

But even more immediately, we disrupt ourselves by being receptive. This means that there is an eventual point where the voluntary and involuntary aspects of experience meet, where what appears to me is at the same time foreign because it simply appears and familiar, because in appearing, I already know myself in receptive relation to it. As subjective receptivity, the event is borne out of the non-overlapping of these two aspects. Its most basic requirement then would be that the event does not force me to think it, *but that in thinking*

the event, I am never one and the same. In other words, I am split between the simple appearance and its intentional grasping. I am “out there”, where the event happens, just as much as I am “here”, perceiving it. There is only an event to speak of when I try to consolidate both of these aspects in perception, understanding, memory. Reflecting on the event subjectively carries with it this twofold aspect, the fact that I am there where the event happens, but that it simply and senselessly appears, its foreignness or exteriority depending on my receptivity. What seems to follow here, is that a phenomenology of the event has to question the very fact of appearance itself as something which is necessarily conditioned by us *without* thereby already becoming familiar.

Understanding and thinking the event means that I am never one and the same because I cannot be at the same time what appears and that for which it appears. This contradicts a phenomenological notion of subjectivity where *a true and whole self* remains beyond this split. One of the most famous versions of this kind of interiority in phenomenology is Husserl’s transcendental consciousness which comprises at the same time the intention and what is intended, *noesis* and *noema*. Here, interior and exterior are clearly demarcated by the difference between what is intended and the act of intending it, as well as what is immanent and what is transcendent to consciousness. This difference makes a separation within the subject possible, but it also guarantees that consciousness, in all its acts, refers implicitly or explicitly to itself.

It is this self-referential nature of consciousness that seems to make thinking an event impossible, because if everything that appears, does so *to* and *for* a consciousness, conscious thinking can never really be disrupted. To leave behind subjective consciousness as our

²⁰ Cf. Heidegger, *Contributions*, 278f.

²¹ Cf. Claude Romano, *There Is. The Event and the Finitude of Appearing*, trans. Michael B. Smith (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016), 61f.

framework, we are again led to a more Heideggerian method of understanding the appearance of Being as the appearance of something altogether different from what we consciously think and perceive. We are again led to think Being as that which withdraws itself while making appearance appear. It would seem that this withdrawal, as of something that is ontologically inaccessible, or concealed, is the only way we can address the dynamic of Being. From a subjective perspective, thinking this withdrawal seems impossible because it would require that my own thinking withdraws from me.

But here, I would again argue that the transcendental constitution of thinking does not equal that we are conscious of everything in the sense of mastering it, or even of enclosing it such that it is clearly separated from ourselves. While the transcendental constitution of consciousness has sometimes led to the conception of an overly intellectual consciousness whose only interest seems to have been objective and scientific reflection²², in a broader sense, “transcendental” may also simply mean that we have to account for the way we experience by reflecting on ourselves, rather than referring to a mysterious *concealment* and withdrawal of Being. What is concealed, from a transcendental perspective, is not the ontological fact of Being, but the process of the constitution of experience. Thus, the transcendental constitution presents us with an interesting and not at all self-evident situation when considering that in thinking the event, I am never one and the same. But how can we hold onto this strangeness and wonder that appearance appears without enclosing it in the immanence of consciousness, nor mystifying it by conceiving it as an ontological irruption?

As in Heidegger’s notion of the event, one has to consider the dimension of time, that is, the question of how Being happens only in and possibly *as* time. While Heidegger’s event constitutes time by opening the *Zeit-Raum* in which past, present and future arrive and “reach” one another²³, *the happening of the event itself takes time as well*. The time that the event takes is the time necessary to unfold the difference within itself, the time it takes to withdraw while giving, where Ereignis becomes Enteignis. The self-differentiating event as time is thus even more originary than the lived time which unfolds into the three dimensions of past, present and future, to the point where Being as *time-space* is considered to be, at first, a pure auto-differentiating, without any “auto” or entity to speak of in the strict sense.²⁴

Considered in a transcendental framework, this non-entity which differentiates itself in order to unfold time *is* the subject. The subject holds together and experiences this difference within itself. I stated above that, as tied to experience, I am never one and the same because I cannot be what appears and that for which it appears *at the same time*. Focusing here on the time that this appearing takes, we do not have to postulate a “split within the subject”, between what appears and to whom it does so. Rather, one could say that the subject experiences this split *as* time: before I differentiate between myself and what appears to me *in time*, I experience my experiencing as the event of self-differentiation.

The difference here to a notion of the event like Heidegger’s is that the event is not an *ad-vent*, it is not a coming of something else, or to something else. Constrained by transcendental constitution, the event depends on my experience and it can only happen *as* my experience.

²² Here, one may especially think of the proponents of Neo-Kantianism against whom Heidegger, often more implicitly than explicitly, argued.

²³ Cf. Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, 13.

²⁴ Cf. *ibid.* 14. For a detailed account of the event as auto-differentiation developed in the context of the *Contributions* cf. James Bahoh, *Heidegger’s Ontology of Events* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020), 169ff.

In one sense, the subject is thus the absolute ground, the place from where difference differentiates itself, so to speak. But in another sense, this process can only be addressed and reflected upon as already constituted, leaving us receptive to it. The problem of the arrival of Being becomes the problem of the constitution of experience.

At this point I would like to raise two problems. Firstly, if the transcendental constitution is requalified such that subjective experience does not appear self-evident, are we then still talking about a transcendental constitution? In other words, is not the transcendental constitution, delineating the specific conditions of experience, incompatible with what I described above as “being tied to experience”, viz. the experience of the event in which I differ from myself? Secondly, does the event only exist insofar as we thematize it? That is, in how far are *experiencing* the event and *reflecting* on the event different acts?

Let us suppose being in a state of an unthematized experience. Once we reflect upon having this experience, we can account for objects appearing *as* objects or reflect on the impression of duration as tied to changes in the objects of perception etc. But when we do so, we are already beyond the wonder that there is experience at all, we have moved past the evental character of experience. Yet, when we do not reflect on the experience, we are merely immersed in our experience without being able to distinguish between ourselves and our perception, unable to conceive the appearance *in its appearing*. Thus, to experience this appearing itself, we have to be conscious of our transcendental constitution without explicitly reflect-

ing on it. In other words, we would have to be conscious and unconscious of this happening at the same time, which is patently absurd.

The concept of the subject presents us here with an aporia. In order to further the discussion of an experience of the event, I turn to a dynamic mentioned above briefly, namely the difference between *Ereignis/Enteignis* (appropriation/expropriation). In his late lecture on *Time and Being*, Heidegger states:

“Sofern nun Geschick des Seins im Reichen der Zeit und diese mit jenem im Ereignis beruhen, bekundet sich im Ereignen das Eigentümliche, daß es sein Eigenstes der schrankenlosen Entbergung entzieht. Vom Ereignen her gedacht, heit dies: Es enteignet sich in dem genannten Sinne seiner selbst. Zum Ereignis als solchem gehört die Enteignis. Durch sie gibt das Ereignis sich nicht auf, sondern bewahrt sein Eigentum.”²⁵

Without being able to fully contextualize these terms, what is important for my discussion is that presencing and absencing of the event are inseparable from one another. In Heidegger’s event, the giving of time and space is not an act that happens only to withdraw itself in the next moment, but a simultaneous happening. So much so that in the *Contributions*, withdrawal, or concealment, at times seems to take precedence over unconcealment because the presence of Being depends on the abyss which, in concealing itself, opens the clearing in which Being can occur (*wesen*).²⁶ Putting this in somewhat more mundane terms, we should not try to think the event from the positivity of some kind of donation, as something which is there or happens only to then disappear again. The event is not a supernatural

²⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007), 27f. “Insofar as the destiny of Being lies in the extending of time, and time, together with Being, lies in Appropriation, Appropriating makes manifest its peculiar property, that Appropriation withdraws what is most fully its own from boundless unconcealment. Thought in terms of Appropriating, this means: in that sense it expropriates itself of itself. Expropriation belongs to Appropriation as such. By this expropriation, Appropriation does not abandon itself—rather, it preserves what is its own.” Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, 22f.

²⁶ Cf. Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy*, 264ff.

gift of Being, akin to a continuously created Christian world, nor is it the transcendental gift of self-presence. Rather, it is what appears in the guise of a certain negativity when we strip away one by one our acquired sense of perception and world.

What does this negativity consist in? As regards to Heidegger's event of appropriation and expropriation, it consists in the fact that *we cannot refer to presence to explain the fact of presencing*. In regards to subjective experience, it means that we cannot refer to our experience *insofar as it is already constituted* if we want to conceive its eventual coming about. The question then is whether and how it is possible to seize the appearing and disappearing of experience, to seize appearance in its disappearance. Of course, this is not possible by focusing on anything present, on a concrete perception which is now present and now vanishes. Whatever I consider in this way may be a fact, but not an event.²⁷

In this article, three factors were sketched out to describe the experience as event, or the appearance of appearance, coming about. Firstly, it is active and passive at the same time, in that I am tied to my experience without feeling coerced by it. Secondly, this state of never being one and the same in experience, of making and suffering experience at the same time, is concomitant to the fact that the experience takes time. The split within experience is unfolded as time, insofar as there is no unitary perspective in which both aspects of experience are articulated *simultaneously*. This differential articulation is, thirdly, akin to the idea of appropriation and expropriation of Heidegger's event, because the split means that in appearing, appearance also disappears, changes in itself. And even though *Ereignis* and *Enteignis* are inseparable, we cannot experience both at

the same time. The sending of Being never coincides with itself because it appears as a certain form of Being, in form of beings. In a subjective sense, the event is the experience *we give ourselves* without ever fully coinciding with it, thereby recreating the problem of thinking the coming of Being itself as thinking the constitution of experience.

Of course, we do not "give" anything in the sense that we can, in giving, become other while also remaining within ourselves, which is just how Heidegger describes the "it gives" of Being.²⁸ To be both at the same time: that which *makes* and transcendently *justifies* its experience might be an abstract description of a subject, but not an apt description of subjective experience. Ultimately, this non-coincidence within my experience recalls Heidegger's philosophy of the event in that it is a wake-up call from the immanence of absolute subjectivity and its access to the world as its representation, whose stability and permanence is at once due to the identity of the beings represented and of Being, or beingness, as eternal and selfsame. According to the suggestion developed here, for this wake-up call, we do not need to refer to an inceptional thinking of Being. Through the eventual character of our experience, we can conceive of the ontological rupture as well, not as an inapparent appearance but as an appearance that *does* appear while questioning, in so doing, to whom it appears.

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²⁷ To be sure, one could argue for the eventual character of facticity itself, but that means grasping the event from a concrete presence rather than from a presencing, cf. François Raffoul, *Thinking the Event* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2020), 110f.

²⁸ Cf. Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, 8.

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