Normativity and grammar of psychological concepts
Keywords:Wittgenstein, Theodor Schatzki, social constructivism, psychological concepts
This essay aims to establish the claim that psychological concepts such as love, desire, depression, etc. have a normative dimension, to then explore the potential source of this normativity. Building on Wittgenstein’s social-constructivist approach, this essay argues that not only the psychological concepts that are available to us, but also our concepts’ normative dimension is a result of our communal life. In Wittgensteinian terminology, normativity should therefore be understood as a grammatical feature of the language-games we play with psychological concepts.
Copyright (c) 2020 Lukas Reimann
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